Sri Narayan Chandra Saha vs Smt. Dipali Mukherjee & Ors. || Case Brief || Feeding grant by estoppe,
- Sambhav Chhabra
- 2 days ago
- 3 min read
Sri Narayan Chandra Saha vs Smt. Dipali Mukherjee & Ors.

Sri Narayan Chandra Saha vs Smt. Dipali Mukherjee & Ors.
Facts
The appellants were inducted as tenants in the suit property by Pradip Kumar Basu, the son of the owner, Pushpamoy Basu. Pradip Kumar Basu allegedly issued rent receipts for over three years while his father was alive. The appellants failed to prove a valid tenancy, and the courts below held they were trespassers.
The original owner, Pushpamoy Basu, died in January 1983. Pradip Kumar Basu then became a co-owner of the property through inheritance. In January 1984, the co-owners, including Pradip Kumar Basu, sold the property to the plaintiff/respondent No. 1. The plaintiff then filed a suit. The central point of contention was whether the initial letting out by Pradip Kumar Basu (before he was a co-owner) was done with or without his father's authority, and whether the appellants could claim protection under Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (TPA).
Issues
Whether Pradip Kumar Basu induced the defendants as tenants with oral permission from his father or without authority.
Whether the initial letting out was lawful, and if not, whether the defendants/appellants are trespassers.
Whether the protection of Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, is available to the appellants, given that Pradip Kumar Basu, who inducted them, later became a co-owner of the property.
Laws Involved
Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (TPA): This section embodies the "doctrine of feeding the grant by estoppel." It provides that if a person erroneously or fraudulently represents that they have the authority to transfer immovable property and then makes a transfer for consideration, and subsequently acquires an interest in that property, the transferee (the person who received the property) can compel the transferor (the person who gave the property) to deliver that interest. This applies only if the contract remains in force.
Section 115 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (Estoppel): This provision prevents a person from denying the truth of a fact that they have previously asserted, either by their own declaration, act, or omission, if another person has been induced to believe that fact and acted upon it, altering their previous position.
Judgment
The court dismissed the second appeals, ruling against the appellants.
The judgment focused heavily on the applicability of Section 43 of the TPA. The Court held that for Section 43 to apply, two conditions must be met:
There must be a fraudulent or erroneous representation by the transferor to the transferee that they are authorised to transfer the property.
The transferee must have acted on the basis of such representation.
The Court found that the appellants' defense in the lower courts lacked the necessary pleadings to invoke Section 43. Specifically, it was never pleaded or proven that Pradip Kumar Basu made any representation that he had the authority to transfer the property (i.e., that he was the owner/landlord) and that the appellants were induced to act upon it. In fact, the evidence and previous pleadings suggested the defendants/appellants knew that Pushpamoy Basu (the father) was the original owner.
Therefore, because the essential element of a representation and the transferee acting on it was missing, the court ruled that Section 43 of the TPA does not apply. The equitable principle under Section 43 cannot be used when the transferee was aware that the transferor lacked title. Since the appellants were already held to be trespassers by the courts below and failed to establish the conditions for Section 43, the second appeals were found to be without merit and were dismissed.
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